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ARGUMENT 
A. 
NATIONWIDE'S "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE IS CONTRARY TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-10 
At Point II of Respondent Nationwide!s Brief/ beginning 
at page 8/ Nationwide argues that its "Other Insurance" clause is 
valid "unless contrary to statute or public policy". Appellant 
respectfully submits that the Other Insurance clause is in fact 
contrary to U.C.A. § 31-41-10/ which was in effect at the time of 
the accident giving rise to appellant's claim. As was argued in 
Appellant's Opening Brief/ § 31-41-10 sets forth specifically the 
only circumstances under which an insurer may exclude its insured 
from receiving personal injury protection benefits. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange v. Call/ Utah, 712 P.2d 231 (1985). 
Nationwide1s characterization of its Other Insurance 
clause as "a limitation on the benefits available" (Respondent's 
Brief/ p. 9) rather than an exclusion is an attempt to exhalt 
form over substance. If the legislature wanted to permit 
insurers to exclude coverage to insureds who had received some, 
but less than complete/ compensation for their medical bills from 
another insurance carrier/ it could have easily added another 
subdivision to § 31-41-10. It is significant to note that upon 
amendment of the Insurance Code in 1986/ the legislature 
specifically sanctioned prorating of liability coverage [U.C.A. § 
31A-22-303(2)(a)] and specifically prohibited stacking of 
uninsured motorist coverage [U.C.A. § 3lA-22-305(6)] but left the 
language of § 31-41-10 intact at § 31A-22-309(2). 
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B. 
NATIONWIDEfS RELIANCE ON MARTIN V. CHRISTENSEN, AN UNINSURED 
MOTORIST CASE, IS NOT PERSUASIVE 
Nationwide argues that because, even prior to the 
enactment of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, this 
court upheld the validity of an "other insurance" clause in a 
case involving an insured who wished to stack uninsured motorist 
benefits [Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 
(1969)], it should do likewise in the instant case involving an 
insured who wishes to stack PIP benefits. Martin involved an 
attempt by a driver to stack uninsured motorist benefits from two 
policies issued by the same insurer on the same vehicle. The 
policy provision which the court considered stated, "With respect 
to any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other 
insurance policy or policies issued to the insured by the company 
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder which . . . would 
result in a total payment . . . in excess of the highest 
applicable limit of liability under any one such policy." This 
court held that "there is nothing in the [uninsured motorist] 
statute which would prevent an insurer, in issuing a second 
policy, from limiting its coverage to the statutory requirement. 
At page 13 of her Opening Brief, appellant pointed out that one 
of the three categories of cases where courts have prohibited 
"stacking" is where "an insured tried to make a claim on multiple 
vehicles insured under one policy or by a single insurer". 
Martin is such a case. 
Closer to the point is Thamert v. Continental Cas. Co., 
Utah, 621 P.2d 706 (1980), also an uninsured motorist coverage 
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case/ where the Court held void a policy provision providing for 
a set off from uninsured motorist benefits for any amounts 
received pursuant to workmen's compensation laws. This court 
held that any insurance policy attempt to reduce the amounts 
payable below that specified in the uninsured motorist statute 
would be contrary to the statute. Similarly/ in the instant 
case/ despite the language of U.C.A. § 31-41-7 providing for 
possible "excess" coverage and priority of payment/ Nationwide 
seeks to set off the payment received by Vickie Crowther from 
another insurance company against the coverage it is statutorily 
bound to provide and for which it accepted premium payments. 
The grounds upon which the courts in some states have 
upheld prohibitions against "stacking" in the uninsured motorist 
context is to prevent the insured from being financially better 
off when he is injured by an uninsured motorist than he would be 
had he been injured by a properly insured motorist. One who is 
injured by an insured motorist has only the tortfeasor's insurer 
to look to for recovery. One who is injured by an uninsured 
motorist who happens to have two policies covering the same 
vehicle/ as was the case in Martin v. Christensen/ supra/ can 
theoretically double his recovery by "stacking" benefits from the 
two policies. This court has expressed that concern. See, Lyon 
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co./ Utah, 480 P.2d 739 
(1971)/ overruled on other grounds at 701 P.2d 798. In the 
instant no-fault benefit dispute, Vickie Crowther has incurred 
more medical bills than the sum of the limits of the two policies 
providing PIP medical benefits. Regardless of whether she is 
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paid by one or both of the insurers/ she is not entitled to claim 
those same benefits in a personal injury lawsuit against the 
driver who struck her, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie/ Utah, 606 P.2d 
1197 (1980). 
Also distinguishable are those foreign jurisdiction 
cases discussed in Nationwidefs brief. In Rana v. Bishop Ins. of 
Hawaii/ Inc./ Haw./ 713 P.2d 1363 (1985)/ Rana sought to stack 
no-fault insurance earning loss coverage on seven different 
automobiles owned by him and used in his taxicab business/ each 
of which was insured by Bishop. He sought benefits of $800 per 
month up to his actual earnings loss of $2/000 per month. One 
provision of the Hawaii no-fault scheme/ HRS § 294-3(c)/ provided 
in part as follows: "'Maximum limit.1 The total no-fault 
benefits payable per person . . . on account of accidental harm 
sustained by him in any one motor vehicle accident shall be 
$15/000/ regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved or 
policies applicable". Another provision, HRS § 294-2(10)/ 
provided/ "fNo-fault benefits' with respect to any accidental 
harm shall be subject to an aggregate limit of $15/000 per person 
. . .." The insurer had paid Rama $800 per month and had 
terminated payments at $15/000. In view of the statutes quoted 
above, the Hawaii court had no trouble concluding that "Based on 
the plain and unambiguous language in HRS §§ 294-2(10) and -3(c); 
buttressed by the statute's legislative history, we construe the 
No-Fault Law to preclude stacking." (713 P.2d at 1367) The Utah 
No-Fault Act, on the other hand, contains no similar "maximum 
limit". 
4 
Kirsch v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 532 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. 
Pa. 1982)/ discussed in Nationwidefs brief beginning at page 19/ 
involved an attempt to stack work loss benefits where the insured 
had a single policy issued by Nationwide insuring two vehicles. 
The insured wished to stack work loss benefits under both 
vehicles and thus receive up to $30/000 in work loss benefits 
despite a statutory $15/000 ceiling on receipt of such benefits. 
It is not at all clear that the same result would have been 
reached had the insured attempted to stack medical benefits. 
See, Antanovich v. Allstate Ins. Co./ Pa., 488 A.2d 571 (1985), 
which points out the Pennsylvania no-fault "Act's distinction 
between unlimited recovery under Sections 103 and 202(a) for 
allowable medical expense and the limited recovery under Section 
202(b) for basic work loss". (488 A.2d at 575) On the other 
hand, the Utah No-Fault Act discusses minimum benefits which must 
be provided under each motor vehicle policy issued in Utah 
(U.C.A. § 31-41-6) but, as previously stated, nowhere discusses 
maximum benefits payable. 
Equally distinguishable is Davis v. Hughes, Kan., 622 
P.2d 641 (1981), discussed in Nationwidefs brief at page 21. In 
Davis, plaintiff was injured in an accident involving her own 
vehicle in which she was a passenger. The vehicle was being 
driven by her husband. She sought to stack PIP benefits and 
uninsured motorist benefits from the policy describing her 
vehicle and from a policy describing a vehicle owned by her son-
in-law, in whose home she resided. The Kansas Supreme Court 
first observed that "This court has previously held uninsured 
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motorist coverage in two policies may be stacked up to the full 
amount of damages sustained" (622 P.2d at 648)/ and concluded it 
was proper to permit the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages 
from the two policies. The court then turned to the issue of 
stacking PIP benefits and looked to a Kansas statute/ K.S.A. 1979 
Supp. 40-3108/ which provided that "Any insurer may exclude [PIP] 
benefits . . . (a) for injury sustained by the named insured and 
relatives residing in the same household while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the named insured and not insured under 
the policy . . .." The policy issued to plaintiff's son-in-law 
contained such an exclusion. In view of the fact that plaintiff/ 
by virtue of being a relative residing in the same household as 
her son-in-law/ was an insured under the son-in-law1s policy and 
was injured in a vehicle owned by her but not described in the 
son-in-law's policy/ the court/ quoting from McNemee v. Farmers 
Insurance Group/ Kan./ 612 P.2d 645 (1980)/ concluded as follows: 
"The question in this case is whether 'stacking' of PIP 
medical benefits is permitted. We hold that it is not. Any 
insurer may exclude benefits required by the Kansas 
Automobile Injury Reparation Act: For injury sustained by 
the named insured and relatives residing in the same 
household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the 
named insured and not insured under the policy . . . . When/ 
as in the present case/ the exclusion has been inserted in a 
PIP endorsement/ the exclusion is binding on the parties. 
The exclusion is authorized by statute and governs the 
extent of personal injury protection benefits recoverable 
when inserted in an insurance contract." (622 P.2d at 649) 
(emphasis added) 
The policy exclusion relied on by the Kansas court to 
prohibit plaintiff in Davis from stacking benefits was an 
exclusion permitted by statute—the same exclusion permitted 
insurers in Utah by U.C.A. § 31-41-10(a)(i). The Davis case is 
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not/ as Nationwide would imply/ authority that every policy 
exclusion or limitation serving to prevent stacking of benefits 
is enforceable. The exclusion advanced by the insurer in Davis 
was permitted by statute. The exclusion from coverage set forth 
in Nationwide!s Other Insurance clause/ whether labeled an 
"exclusion" or a "limitation"/ is not one specified in U.C.A. § 
31-41-10. 
The one case which has been cited to the court which 
considered the effect of an "other insurance" clause in the 
context of an effort to stack no-fault benefits is Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Lopez/ Nev./ 567 P.2d 471 (1977). In that case Lopez 
sustained injury when his automobile collided with that of an 
uninsured motorist. His automobile was covered under two 
separate policies/ each containing no-fault coverage. His 
medical bills exceeded the limits of medical benefits available 
under the combined limits of both policies. One of the insurers 
paid its limits. The other. Travelers, refused to pay relying in 
part on the "other insurance" clause in its policy. The Nevada 
Supreme Court noted that the original reason for "other 
insurance" clauses—to prevent overinsurance and double recovery 
under property and fire insurance policies—was of limited 
importance under an automobile liability policy and that "If 
there ever was a strong rationale for the use of fother 
insurance1 clauses it has, on facts such as those presently 
before us, substantially evaporated". (567 P.2d at 475) The 
court construed the "other insurance" clause to mean "that the 
insured shall not collect twice for the same medical bills" (567 
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P.2d at 474) and held that "the better view favors respondent's 
position that an insured is entitled to payment in full up to the 
policy limit/ with respect to each policy under which coverage is 
afforded/ and that fother insurance1 clauses and similar clauses 
which purport to limit liability are void". Id. 
C. 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FROM NATIONWIDE 
IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE 
UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT 
Appellant acknowledges that when enacted the purpose of 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act was to "stabilize/ if 
not effectuate certain savings in/ the rising costs of automobile 
accident insurance"- U.C.A. § 31-41-2. Vickie Crowther is only 
attempting to be indemnified from as many of the medical bills 
she incurred as a result of her accident as policy limits will 
permit. She is not seeking payment of benefits in excess of the 
limits of the policy on which she paid premiums. In no event is 
she going to recive full indemnification for her medical bills 
through receipt of PIP benefits; payment of benefits by 
Nationwide will not result in receipt of duplicative benefits. 
Appellant submits that requiring Nationwide to pay benefits for 
which it accepted a premium/ when the clear language of U.C.A. § 
31-41-7(2) contemplates possible payment under more than one 
policy/ "including those complying with this act"/ will do 
nothing to thwart the legislature's intentions. 
1. Appellant wishes to note/ for whatever significance it may 
have/ the absence of a "purpose" statute in that portion of the 
new Insurance Code7 Title 31A, Chapter 22/ Part III/ dealing with 
motor vehicle insurance. 
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D. 
SHOULD SHE PREVAIL ON THIS APPEAL, 
FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE V. CALL OUGHT NOT PRECLUDE 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO APPELLANT 
In its brief. Nationwide argues that Farmers Ins. 
Exchange v. Call/ Utah, 712 P.2d 231 (1985)/ precludes an award 
of attorney fees to Vickie Crowther because there is no evidence 
that Nationwide acted in bad faith in denying benefits. The 
opinion in Farmers Ins. Exchange fails to take into account the 
language or purpose of U.C.A. § 31-41-8/ reenacted in 
substantially unchanged form at U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(5). 
Farmers Ins. Exchange/ quoting from American States 
Insurance Co. v. Walker/ 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971), 
does state as follows: 
"Before an award of attorney's fees [can] be made in 
the declaratory judgment action/ it must appear that the 
insurance company acted in bad faith or fraudulently or was 
stubbornly litigious." . . . The defendant has not 
demonstrated that this litigation was not brought in good 
faith. 
When faced with a decision as to whether to defend or 
refuse to defend/ an insurer is entitled to seek a 
declaratory judgment as to its obligations and rights. 
[citation] An award of attorney fees is not warranted 
'where the plaintiff merely stated its position and 
initiated this action for determination of what appears to 
be a justiciable controversy1 Western Casualty & Surety Co. 
v. Marchant/ Utah, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (1980)." (emphasis 
added) 
Contrary to the Farmers Ins. Exchange, American States 
Insurance Co./ and Western Casualty & Surety Co. cases/ 
Nationwide did not bring a declaratory judgment action in order 
to have its rights and obligations judicially determined. 
Instead/ Nationwide simply denied coverage (R. 48) and placed the 
onus on Mrs. Crowther to seek judicial relief. Appellant does 
9 
not contend that failure to file a declaratory judgment action in 
and of itself constitutes bad faith. Nor does appellant claim 
that Nationwide has in any way exhibited bad faith. Appellant 
does submit that Nationwidefs wrongful denial of benefits, when 
coupled with its failure to seek declaratory relief, justify 
imposition of attorney fees upon no greater degree of culpability 
than its mistake as to the law resulting in detriment to its 
insured. Assuming Vickie Crowther prevails on this appeal, the 
question should be: "If an insurer guesses wrong as to whether 
coverage to its insured is available, who is to bear the burden 
of the insured1s attorney fees so as to enable the insured to 
recoup 100% of the benefits to which she was entitled? Appellant 
respectfully submits that to ask the question is to answer it. 
If Vickie Crowther prevails on this appeal, whether her attorney 
is being paid on an hourly basis, pursuant to a percentage 
contingent fee, or on a flat rate basis, she will not net the 
$2,000 to which she submits she was entitled unless she is also 
awarded attorney fees. 
If the Farmers Ins. Exchange holding on attorney fees 
cannot be distinguished on the basis that Farmers took the 
initiative of filing a declaratory relief action, then this court 
should overrule the attorney fee holding in Farmers. If a 
finding of bad faith is required before an insured becomes 
entitled to attorney fees from her insurer based upon nonpayment 
of no-fault benefits, the last sentence of U.C.A. § 31-41-8 would 
be legislative surplusage. A prevailing litigant can claim 
attorney fees in every case in which the opposing party brings an 
action or asserts a defense in bad faith. U.C.A. § 78-27-56. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that a review of the new Insurance 
Code, Utah Code Ann. Title 31A/ shows a clear legislative intent 
to distinguish between the permissable exclusions, limitations 
and conditions allowed an insurer providing no-fault benefits, 
and those allowed an insurer providing liability or uninsured 
motorist benefits. 
Nationwidefs "Other Insurance" clause is a limitation 
to coverage not permitted by U.C.A. § 31-41-10 and/ as applied to 
Vickie Crowther/ should be held void. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the Order (summary 
judgment) entered by the District Court should be reversed and 
that summary judgment should be entered in her favor and against 
respondent Nationwide for $2/000 together with interest/ costs/ 
and reasonable attorney fees. The action should be remanded to 
the District Court for determination of the appropriate amount of 
attorney fees. 
Dated: November 1986. 
y y * ^ 
STEVEN H. LYBBBRT 
Attorney for Appellant 
Vickie D. Crowther 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /'7A day of November, 1986, I 
hand delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply 
Brief to John R. Lund, Esq., attorney for respondent, at 10 
Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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